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Abstract
Background: New Zealand's Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) was introduced in 2002.
Its features are substantial increases in government funding delivered as capitation payments, and
newly-created service-purchasing agencies. The objectives are to reduce health disparities and to
improve health outcomes.
Analysis: The NZPHCS changes New Zealand's publicly-funded primary health care payments
from targeted welfare benefits to universal, risk-rated insurance premium subsidies. Patient
contributions change from fee-for-service top-ups to insurance premium top-ups, and are collected
by service providers who, depending upon their contracts with purchasers, may also be either
insurance agents or risk-bearing insurance companies. The change invokes the tensions associated
with allocating risk-bearing amongst providers, patients and insurance companies that accompany
all insurance-based funding instruments. These include increases in existing incentives for over-
consumption and new incentives for insurers to limit their exposure to variations in patient health
states by engaging in active patient pool selection.
The New Zealand scheme is complex, but closely resembles United States insurance-based, risk-
rated managed care schemes. The key difference is that unlike classic managed care models, where
provider remuneration is determined by the insurer, the historic right for general practitioners to
autonomously set patient charges alters the fiscal incentives normally available to managed care
organisations. Consequently, the insurance role is being devolved to individual service providers
with very small patient pools, who must recoup the premium top-ups from insured individuals.
Premium top-ups are being collected only from those individuals consuming care, in proportion to
the number of times care is sought. Co-payments thus constitute perfectly risk-rated premium
levies set by inefficiently small insurers, raising questions about the efficiency and equity of a
'universal' insurance system pooling total population demands and costs. The efficacy of using
financial incentives to constrain costs and encourage innovation when providers retain the right to
arbitrarily recoup costs directly from patients, is also questioned.
Results: Initial evidence suggests that total costs are higher than initially expected, and prices to
some patients have risen substantially under the NZPHCS. Limited competition and NZPHCS
governance requirements mean current institutional arrangements are unlikely to facilitate
efficiency improvements. System design changes therefore appear indicated.
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Background
New Zealand's state-funded primary health care system
has undergone fundamental structural and financial
change following the implementation of the Primary
Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS), beginning in 2002 [1].
The principal stated objectives of the NZPHCS are to
reduce health disparities, to improve health outcomes and
to increase the share of government funding in primary
care. In pursuit of these objectives, the NZPHCS utilises
two financial instruments and a structural instrument.
The financial instruments are an increase in the quantum
of taxpayer funds applied to primary health care (a 43%
increase in the first three years [2], with $1.7 billion addi-
tional funds being applied over 6 years [3]), and universal
capitation funding for all enrolled citizens, irrespective of
individual consumption of primary health care services.
Whilst all citizens are eligible to receive capitation fund-
ing, the rate paid varies depending upon patient character-
istics such as age, gender, ethnicity and financial
deprivation, and the characteristics of the entity to which
the capitation subsidies are paid (see Table 1).
The structural instrument is community-based nonprofit
Primary Health Organisations (PHOs), created to register
eligible individuals, receive associated capitation monies,
co-ordinate delivery of care to registered individuals and
manage the associated service delivery contracts. PHOs
are also charged with responding to the health needs and
preferences of their communities and developing innova-
tive ways of providing services that people can afford [4].
There are no restrictions placed upon the nature (either
for-profit or nonprofit) of the entities with whom the
PHOs can enter into contracts, or the nature of the finan-
cial or operational risk-sharing that these contracts may
entail. The only requirement is that PHOs be nonprofit
entities openly accountable to the public for their deci-
sion-making, with contracted service providers and com-
munities being represented in their governance and
decision-making [5]. As District Health Boards (DHBs)
oversee the contracts with PHOs, the NZPHCS requires
that PHOs are formed within DHB boundaries.
The relationships between the government, its primary
policy-making agency the Ministry of Health, the 21 geo-
graphically-determined government service purchasing
and delivery agencies the DHBs, the PHOs, service provid-
ers and patients under the NZPHCS is illustrated in Figure
1.
This paper examines the NZPHCS by analysing the
changes in the contractual relationships and institutions
relative to the pre-NZPHCS contracts and institutions.
Specifically, it examines the intertwined implications of
changing the principal government-funding instrument
from a fee-for-service payment to a capitation payment,
and the substitution of PHOs for service providers as the
'other party' with taxpayers, patients and the government
in the social contract for overseeing the purchase and
delivery of subsidised health care.
Analysis of Contractual Changes
The change in the subsidy from a targeted welfare benefit
upon the consumption of services to a universal subsidy
independent of consumption alters the nature of the
residual risk-bearing for variations in individual patient
consumption of health services (that is, variations in indi-
viduals' underlying health states). Pre-NZPHCS, the gov-
ernment underwrote the risks of demand variation for a
small number of subsidised individuals whilst the major-
ity of individuals self-insured. Risk-sharing was required
only for the subsidised proportion of the population.
Under the NZPHCS, as over ninety percent of the popula-
tion receives subsidies, the risks and costs associated with
variations in the health states of the nearly the entire pop-
ulation are shared. In the first instance, PHOs are required
to underwrite these risks, but can subcontract these risks
onto service providers via service provision contracts. Via
their ability to levy patient charges in addition to revenues
received from PHOs, service providers may subcontract
these risks further onto those who consume primary
health care. Whilst the motivation for changes in locus of
risk-bearing is to alter the behaviour of sector participants
(principally service providers), the contracts that are
emerging under the NZPHCS reveal that a reallocation of
some of these risks is occurring in ways that are likely to
lead to higher costs in total, an inequitable allocation of
these additional costs amongst patients, and less efficient
outcomes relative to the pre-NZPHCS contracts. The evo-
lution of the entities engaging in contracting and the less-
efficient contracts that they are entering into, appears to
result from the acceptance under the NZPHCS that the
pre-NZPHCS contractual arrangement allowing service
providers to levy patient charges directly will continue
under the new system. Whilst the strategy anticipates that
structures and contracts will evolve over time in response
to competitive pressures [6], as long as the practitioner
right to levy patient charges independent of contractual
constraints applied by the PHOs prevails, service provid-
ers continue to predominate in the governance of PHOs,
and competitive pressures upon PHO-service provider co-
operatives remains weak, it is likely that the current
higher-cost arrangements will become entrenched.
Pre-NZPHCS Arrangements
The NZPHCS arrangements mark a fundamental change
to the public-private partnership between government
and privately-owned service providers (principally general
practitioners) that characterised government subsidy of
primary health care in New Zealand between the lateAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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1930s and 2002. The public-private partnership arose out
of a compromise between medical practitioners and the
government in order to allow the Social Security Act 1938
and the subsequent Social Security Amendment Act 1941
to be passed [7]. Whilst the government at the time
wished to offer 'free to the patient' taxation-funded health
care, as in England's NHS, there was widespread opposi-
tion from members of the medical profession, who
wished to retain their autonomy as private sector owners
of the businesses delivering medical treatment. The out-
come of the compromise was a bifurcation of the health
sector into fully government-owned and funded public
hospital, maternity and mental health services and pri-
vately-owned primary and specialist services. The govern-
Table 1: PHO Types and Annual Capitation Subsidies, 2004–5 [67]
Capitaiton Subsidies
GMS/Nurse Services to Improve Access
PHO Type Interim Access All
HUHC HUHC Maori/Pacific Non Maori/Pacific
Age Group Gender CSC N Y N Y 1 thru 4 5 1 thru 4 5
00–04 F Y $308.12 $471.96 $315.73 $471.96 $63.15 $126.29 $0.00 $63.15
N $308.12 $471.96
M Y $327.88 $471.96 $332.42 $471.96 $66.48 $132.97 $0.00 $66.48
N $327.88 $471.96
05–14 F Y $79.33 $302.61 $99.94 $302.61 $19.99 $39.98 $0.00 $19.99
N $79.33 $302.61
M Y $75.18 $302.61 $93.54 $302.61 $18.71 $37.42 $0.00 $18.71
N $75.18 $302.61
15–24 F Y $78.90 $291.50 $92.22 $291.50 $18.44 $36.89 $0.00 $18.44
N $36.09 $291.50
M Y $42.38 $291.50 $50.75 $291.50 $10.15 $20.30 $0.00 $10.15
N $20.79 $291.50
25–44 F Y $72.61 $291.50 $81.04 $291.50 $16.21 $32.41 $0.00 $16.21
N $7.32 $291.50
M Y $43.16 $291.50 $52.38 $291.50 $10.48 $20.95 $0.00 $10.48
N $5.91 $291.50
45–64 F Y $88.74 $319.27 $110.99 $319.27 $22.20 $44.40 $0.00 $22.20
N $12.22 $319.27
M Y $67.96 $319.27 $82.90 $319.27 $16.58 $33.16 $0.00 $16.58
N $9.57 $319.27
65+ F Y $191.27 $342.40 $191.27 $342.40 $38.25 $76.51 $0.00 $38.25
N $191.27 $342.40
M Y $164.95 $342.40 $164.95 $342.40 $32.99 $65.98 $0.00 $32.99
N $164.95 $342.40
Per capita management fees are paid irrespective of Access or Interim status, and are based upon PHO size:
• $9.61 per individual up to 20,000 and $4.67 per individual thereafter, for PHOs with fewer than 75,000 registered individuals
• $6.41 for the first 20,000, $5.83 for individuals 20,001 to 75000, and $5.25 for all others, for PHOs with more than 75,000 registered individuals
Definitions
PHO Types:
• Interim PHOs: more than 50% of the registered population of Maori or Pacific Island Ethnicity, or living in areas determined to be in NZ 
Deprivation Index deciles 9 or 10.
• Access PHOs: the remainder
Individual Characteristics:
• HUHC: High User Health Card – individual with 12 or more GP consultations in 12 months
• CSC: Community Services Card – identifies low income or beneficiary status of registered individual – irrelevant for registered patients of Access 
practices
Capitation Subsidy Type:
• GMS/Nurse: subsidy for first contact services provided by General Practitioner or practice nurse – nominally based upon an effective consultation 
subsidy of $36.40 for children under 6 and $26 for all other population groups eligible for low or reduced cost access, thereby presuming 13 fully 
subsidised visits for a HUHC young child and 8.5 for others; 6.3 partially subsidised visits per annum for a 65+ man and 7.4 for a 65+ woman (3.3 
and 3.8 fully subsidised visits respectively assuming a $50 cost per visit).
• Services to Improve Access: capitation to develop access initiatives for high-needs populations (paid in addition to GMS/Nurse capitationAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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ment agreed to partially fund services provided by the
private sector, whilst private practitioners retained the
right to levy additional charges to patients [8].
Under the arrangements brokered in the 1930s, the 'social
contract' resulted in private sector general medical practi-
tioners being paid a fixed fee from taxation revenue for
each treatment provided to eligible patients (termed a
'Section 88 Payment for General Medical Services', after
the relevant section of the Act in which it was instituted).
The payments were 'fee-for-service' in that they were paid
for each consultation rendered to eligible patients by eli-
gible practitioners. Whilst for administrative simplicity
the payments were made direct to the servicing practi-
tioner, in effect they constituted a 'welfare benefit' granted
to an eligible patient, in that they were a part-payment of
the debt incurred by the patient to the practitioner when
medical treatment was sought by, and delivered to, the
patient. The level of the subsidy was determined by indi-
vidual patient characteristics and paid upon consumption
of services. General practitioners were free to levy patients
for the difference between the 'Section 88' payment (sub-
sidy) and their actual costs of service delivery – the
balance of the patient's debt, which was termed the
'patient co-payment'. As all registered general practition-
ers were eligible to receive 'Section 88' payments, there
The New Zealand Primary Health Care Sector Figure 1
The New Zealand Primary Health Care Sector.
Source: King (2001) [1]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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were no constraints placed upon patient choice of practi-
tioner. These contractual arrangements are illustrated in
Figure 2. Initially, the primary health care 'welfare benefit'
was universal, in that all citizens were eligible to receive
financial assistance, although the amount paid varied
with patient characteristics (principally age). In the early
1990s, the subsidies became more tightly targeted, with
family income, patient age and patient health state (prin-
cipally the number of visits made in a twelve-month
period) being the primary determinants of both eligibility
for, and the size of, the subsidy.
Over time, the 'welfare benefit' share of the cost of general
practitioner consultations fell substantially. When the
NZPHCS was implemented, the government's contribu-
tion amounted to only 30% of general practitioner reve-
nues [9]. The remaining 70% came from out-of-pocket
expenses, or patient-funded private insurance contribu-
tions. Historically, private medical insurance has pro-
vided only a very small share of New Zealand primary
health care costs, with fewer than 35% of the population
having private medical insurance [10], and only 15% of
total private medical insurance expenditure being applied
to primary health care costs in the late 1990s [11]. As the
range of available primary health care treatments
increased, dissatisfaction grew with the restriction of sub-
sidy payments solely to general practitioners and the
'medical intervention model' that it incentivised, poten-
tially at the expense of models and practitioner types (e.g.
nurses, dieticians, physiotherapists, social workers, educa-
tors) promoting the pursuit of wellness in the population.
During the 1990s, additional government funding was
applied to a variety of contracts with a wider range of
Pre NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts Figure 2
Pre NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts.
S88 for GMS
Supplementary Service
Delivery
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multi-disciplinary primary health providers (often, but
not exclusively, nonprofit charitable trusts), typically serv-
ing high-need individuals or communities (often commu-
nities of specific geography, ethnicity, disease state or high
health need). These contracts were typically either capita-
tion-based (a fixed annual fee per individual eligible to
receive the services offered) or price-and-volume-based (a
fixed fee for a specific number of consultations). These
relationships are also illustrated in Figure 2. In addition, a
number of general practitioners moved voluntarily onto
capitation-based payments as allowed under the Social
Security Amendment Act 1941. Capitated practitioners
retained the right to levy patients for the shortfall between
capitation subsidies and actual costs. It is estimated that as
many as 22% of general practitioners were receiving capi-
tation funding in 2001 [12], although the number of
patients involved is unknown. By 2001, government
funded around 40% of the costs of all primary health care
via both 'Section 88' and other contractual arrangements
[13].
NZPHCS Arrangements
The NZPHCS fundamentally rewrites the 'social contract'
between taxpayers, the government and general practi-
tioners, with consequent changes in responsibilities and
cash flows in the sector. The private-sector partners who
receive government funding for primary health care under
the new 'social contract' are no longer general practition-
ers and other service providers, but are the newly-created
nonprofit Primary Health Organisations (PHOs). PHOs
are charged with recruiting and registering patients for
whom they will be responsible for purchasing and co-
ordinating a range of primary health care services that will
deliver upon the NZPHCS objectives of improved health
outcomes and reduced disparities. PHOs are free to enter
into contracts with any service providers (including, but
not restricted to, general practitioners and providers
receiving government contracts under the 1990s arrange-
ments). Service providers who previously participated in
'Section 88' or other government-funded primary health
care contracts must now enter into individual agreements
with PHOs if they wish to receive income originating from
government sources. Service providers are now no longer
directly parties to the NZPHCS 'social contract': they par-
ticipate in it only as subcontractors to a PHO. The terms
and conditions of PHO-provider contracts appear to be
freely negotiable between the parties concerned. In princi-
ple, this freedom of contract implies that PHOs need not
bound by the requirements of the historic 'social contract'
in their dealings with general practitioners or any other
service providers.
Citizens who wish to receive government subsidies for pri-
mary health care under the NZPHCS 'social contract' are
now required to have an explicit contractual relationship
with a PHO. Unlike the pre-NZPHCS system, subsidies
are universal, and are paid every quarter, irrespective of
the actual quantity of health care a PHO-registered indi-
vidual actually consumes in that period. Whilst for
administrative convenience government payments are
made direct to the PHO, it is the patient's contract with
the PHO that determines government-sourced cash flows.
In effect, the subsidy is a notional 'voucher' allocated to an
individual and paid to the individual's chosen PHO upon
production of evidence of the existence of a patient-PHO
contractual relationship. A new contractual relationship,
distinct from any other relationship that may exist
between the individual as a patient and a service provider
who may be acting as a PHO, is required because the basis
of government funding has changed from the historic
'Section 88' instances of treatment (information histori-
cally supplied by service providers) to instances of PHO
registration (a metric independent of any consumption of
services and hence independent of service providers).
The patient's contractual relationship with the PHO
grants the PHO both the right and the obligation to enter
into contracts with service providers on behalf of the reg-
istered patient. The PHO-contracted service provider's
obligation to provide subsidised care for a PHO-registered
patient, either when the patient falls ill and requires
treatment, or in respect of any well-patient services the
PHO-provider contracts specify (e.g. preventative medi-
cine, education), stems from the patient-PHO-service pro-
vider contractual nexus rather than from any other
obligations or arrangements that may exist or may have
existed historically between the patient and the service
provider. Whilst capitated patients may nominate a pre-
ferred primary care provider, they are not restricted from
seeking care from another provider. The NZPHCS allows
for cash clawbacks by PHOs/practitioners delivering treat-
ment for services provided to patients registered by other
PHOs/practitioners. Clawbacks are made on a per-treat-
ment basis using population-based averages of the
number of visits made by patients of the relevant patient's
class, and the quarterly capitation payment for that class
of patient. Clawbacks can amount for up to 10% of quar-
terly general practitioner revenues [14].
The new contractual relationships outlined in the
NZPHCS are illustrated in Figure 3.
Transition Between Strategies
Whilst Figure 3 shows a direct relationship between the
patient and the PHO, in practice there is rarely a direct,
independent relationship. For administrative conven-
ience, contracted service providers have been utilised as
agents of the PHOs to facilitate the creation and mainte-
nance of patient-PHO relationships: "existing lists of the
patients who normally attend a practice or health clinicAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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may form the starting point for enrolment" [15]. Indeed,
a patient 'signals' a change in the PHO-patient relation-
ship in most instances not on the basis of any direct trans-
action with the PHO, but by electing to change the
preferred primary service provider. If the second provider
has a contractual relationship with a different PHO from
the first provider, the patient is deemed to have 'changed
PHOs'. PHO revenue streams (and by extension,
participation by their service provider-agents in govern-
ment-subsidised service delivery contracts) are thus deter-
mined by the relationships between patients and the
provider-agents. As PHO formation requires certainty of
current and future revenue streams, and this certainty
relies upon ongoing provider-patient relationships, most
PHOs have been created based upon existing networks of
service providers, such as general practitioner-governed
Independent Practitioner Associations and community
health organisations (including those based around com-
munities of specific ethnicity) with strong provider
networks.
The PHO creation arrangement also leads to PHOs bind-
ing service providers to exclusive contracts, denying them
the right to enter into contracts simultaneously with any
NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts Figure 3
NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts.
Key: Contracts
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other PHO. Exclusive contracts are necessary as service
providers with multiple PHO contracts cannot be relied
upon to recruit and retain patients for a specific PHO.
Consequently, PHOs compete with each other in order to
sign up service providers rather than competing with each
other to sign up patients. The PHO-service provider rela-
tionship 'crowds out' any incentives for PHOs to develop
and manage direct relationships with patients independ-
ent of service providers, and results in effective
competition in the sector being restricted to competing
vertical alliances of PHOs and their exclusive providers
[16]. The NZPHCS further requires that a PHO's con-
tracted service providers (both those involved it its crea-
tion, and those who join subsequently) be active
participants in the organisation's ongoing governance and
management: "all providers and practitioners must be
involved in the organisation's decision-making" [17].
Existing service providers are thus pivotal to the creation
and operation of PHOs, with existing collectives advan-
taged by utilising existing relationships to 'become a
PHO'. The operation of PHOs formed on this basis is
likely to be strongly influenced by the providers around
which the PHOs are formed.
The actual PHO registration, governance and manage-
ment processes that have emerged raise the question of
whether under the NZPHCS service providers are operat-
ing as contracted agents of PHOs, or whether PHOs
organised around existing provider groups are in effect
acting as service provider co-operatives (or even 'provider
agents'). If the latter is an accurate representation of actual
behaviour, then PHOs offer those providers (or groups of
providers) who received subsidies pre-NZPHCS and who,
through their collective bargaining ability, historically
exhibited significant ability to influence the terms and
conditions upon which government primary health care
spending was applied, the ongoing ability to ensure access
to, and to determine the contractual application of, gov-
ernment subsidies. If service providers control both PHO
decision-making and PHO patient registration, it is
unlikely that PHOs can freely enter into service provider
contracts that are optimal for registered patients and con-
tracting DHBs, and in the interests of the long-term finan-
cial viability and independence of the PHO itself, without
jeopardising the relationships with providers upon which
they are dependent for deriving their membership and
hence their current and future revenue streams. If signifi-
cant impediments to PHOs' independence and freedom
to contract exist, then there may be substantial obstacles
to the NZPHCS achieving its stated objectives efficiently
using the PHO instrument as it is currently defined.
Registration Incentives
Outside of the NZPHCS, patients and service providers
have complete freedom to enter into any contractual rela-
tionship of their choosing. The historic 'Section 88' pay-
ments will prevail at the 2001 levels. However, patients
who opt for the pre-NZPHCS arrangements (and the
PHOs who would otherwise register them) are denied
access to the substantially more generous subsidies avail-
able under the NZPHCS. For example, a patient not qual-
ifying for a 'Section 88' subsidy who consumes no services
will generate revenue but no cost for a PHO under the
NZPHCS. The same patient receives no funding at all if
opting to remain under the 'Section 88' payment system,
even if services are consumed, as there is no subsidy eligi-
bility under this regime.
The availability of subsidies unrelated to actual consump-
tion of health care is intended to provide strong incentives
for PHOs to register individuals, consistent with the strat-
egy's intention to increase the quantum of care provided
to individuals who have not historically consumed health
care and have poor health states. However, the PHO
incentive to register is strongest in respect of those individ-
uals who historically have not consumed large quantities
of care due to their better-than-average underlying health
states. These individuals bring revenues to the PHO based
upon population averages, but the costs they incur are
less, as they will likely consume fewer services. This
exposes the NZPHCS to the risk of PHOs and their regis-
tering agents engaging in active patient pool selection
('cream-skimming') as it favours registering entities that
can identify and register more profitable healthier-than-
average individuals and exclude individuals who are less
healthy than average and therefore less profitable. Yet it is
the less-healthy-than-average individuals whose under-
consumption of services under the pre-NZPHCS system
was perceived to be contributing to substantial differences
in patient health outcomes. Such pool selection incentives
were not present under the 'Section 88' fee-for-service con-
tracts, as service providers were fully compensated for all
treatments provided, paid either by the individual or a
combination of the individual and the state subsidy only
in respect of treatments provided, irrespective of the
patient's underlying health state.
The NZPHCS in Action
By December 2004, under the NZPHCS, capitation subsi-
dies were being paid on behalf of 3.7 million New Zea-
landers (92.5% of the population) to 77 nonprofit PHOs
[18], who enter into contracts with service providers for
the delivery of primary health care to those individuals
who fall ill. The subsidies vary depending upon the age,
gender, income and historical health state of the regis-
tered individual, and upon PHO characteristics, deter-
mined by registered population size, and the ethnicity and
deprivation levels of the registered population (see Table
1). Two types of PHO exist based upon these characteris-
tics: Access and Interim. Higher-subsidised Access PHOsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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are required to have a registered patient base with at least
50% of individuals exhibiting specific ethnicity and finan-
cial deprivation characteristics [19].
General practitioners have taken a leading role in PHO
formation. For example, thirteen of the South Island's sev-
enteen PHOs are affiliated to Southlink IPA, and four-
teenth, New Zealand's largest, is also based around an
existing general practitioner-based primary health care
collective. Consequently, over 92% of South Island PHO
registrants belong to a general practitioner-formed PHO
[20]. Practitioner influence over PHOs need not be con-
fined to practitioner involvement in PHO formation. Wel-
lington Independent Practice Association Limited (WIPA
Ltd), a private company owned by fifty-nine general prac-
titioners, has contracts to provide all management services
to five PHOs across three DHBs in the lower North Island.
The WIPA-managed PHOs have a combined market share
of over 85%, and their contracts grant WIPA Ltd rights to
act as if it were the PHO in respect of strategy, financial
operation, service contracting and service development
[21]. Nationwide, around 90% of the registered popula-
tion is served by PHOs formed around general practi-
tioner-dominated alliances.
The 77 PHOs in existence at December 2004 range in size
between 3300 and 330,000 registered patients. They are
also unevenly spread both geographically and by funding
type. Higher-subsidised Access PHOs have on average
19,000 registered patients (median 11,200), whilst lower-
subsidised Interim PHOs average 53,000 patients
(median 31,200) [22]. South Island DHBs have on aver-
age 3.2 PHOs in their territories, whilst North Island
DHBs have an average of 4.6 [23]. Only six percent South
Island PHOs qualify for higher-subsidised Access funding,
compared to sixty percent of North Island PHOs. Over
41% of individuals registered in the higher-subsidised
Access PHOs in 2003 did not exhibit the population-
based characteristics upon which the subsidy differentials
are based [24]. If the population-based demographic char-
acteristics upon which the subsidy differentials are based
are good proxies for the actual costs of the differing
underlying health needs of individuals, the high registra-
tion of non-Access individuals in Access PHOs suggests
that active pool selection is occurring based upon subsidy
differences.
Competition between the 77 PHOs is negligible, largely
because of the geographic constraints that they be formed
within DHB jurisdictions. Using as a benchmark for the
presence of competition a three-firm concentration level
of PHOs in each DHB area of less than 70%, and the larg-
est PHO having a market share (measured as a PHO's
share of the total PHO-registered population in a DHB
area) of no more than 40%, there is little evidence of any
meaningful competition occurring between PHOs [25].
On closer examination, most PHOs enjoy a local geo-
graphic monopoly. Even where patients have a notional
choice of PHOs, effective choice does not appear to exist
as PHOs are differentiated principally upon ethnicity and
subsidy types, rendering the ability for the majority of
patients to substitute practically non-existent. Higher-
funded Access PHOs have no incentive to register individ-
uals with non-Access characteristics if doing so would
threaten the ability to claim higher subsidies for the entire
registered base. Most Access PHOS are already close to the
thresholds for non-Access registrants, making such substi-
tutions unlikely to occur, even if there were no implicit
ethnicity barriers discouraging substitution [26].
Discussion
The evidence to date suggests that despite the intention of
the NZPHCS to change the identity of the 'other party' to
the 'social contract' by establishing PHOs as new contract-
ing entities, existing service providers, and in particular,
general practitioners, have utilised the NZPHCS structures
to replicate what appears to be similar relationships and
responsibilities to those prevailing pre-NZPHCS. If gen-
eral practitioners can dominate PHO decision-making,
then under the guise of PHO governors they can continue
to act as the de facto 'other party' to the social contract, as
detailed in Figure 2. But whilst the NZPHCS structures
may enable them to take these roles and in doing so pre-
serve the outward form of previous relationships, the
change in the funding instrument from targeted fee-for-
service welfare benefits to universal insurance premium
subsidies fundamentally alters the nature of the contracts
which these relationships must fulfil. If the relationships
prevail under the assumptions of the pre-NZPHCS fund-
ing contracts, but are required to serve the objectives
intended under the NZPHCS arrangements, the potential
exists for significant divergence between the intentions of
the strategy and its outcomes. Intended outcomes may
not be achievable, or if they are, it may be at substantially
greater cost than if the NZPHCS relationships and con-
tracts were built afresh. The balance of the paper discusses
the key changes to contracts and relationships arising
from the creation of a universal insurance instrument, and
analyses the ways in which the relationships that have
emerged under the NZPHCS institutions based upon pre-
existing relationships are likely to affect the ability to
deliver the intended objectives efficiently.
Subsidised Health Care: a Two-Sided Market
A fundamental distinction between markets for health
care and markets for many other products is that patient-
based demand for health care is a 'derived demand'
arising from the occurrence of a stochastic event – illness.
The unpredictability of falling ill, and the often-substan-
tial costs associated with seeking treatment, createsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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demand uncertainty. In order to manage this uncertainty,
individuals may prefer to 'pool' some of their risks and the
associated costs of falling ill via private sector insurance
schemes or centralised, taxpayer-funded institutions.
These centralised entities then enter into contracts with
service providers on behalf of the individuals to ensure
both that treatments are provided when the patient falls
ill, and that the service providers will receive payments for
their services [27]. The central contracting entity, which
may be an insurance company, a government agency or
some other institution, becomes the 'hub' in a 'two-sided
market' [28], entering into contracts on the one side with
the individuals who seek certainty of access to and pay-
ment (or at least part-payment) for treatment, and on the
other side with services providers who will deliver those
treatments. The 'hub' entities maximise their profits (or
optimise the health purchasing for their registered popu-
lations) by pooling the revenues received in respect of
their registered populations and purchasing services only
in respect of that subset of the pool that suffers an 'adverse
event' (falls ill) and demands services. The two-sided mar-
ket thus comprises a risk management (insurance) market
on the one side, and a health service purchasing market
on the other.
The Pre-NZPHCS 'Two-Sided Market'
Prior to the NZPHCS, government via the Ministry of
Health operated the 'primary health care hub' in respect of
the small proportion of individuals targeted for subsi-
dised primary health care. Revenues in respect of targeted
individuals were provided from taxation, comprising the
'risk management' component of the two-sided market,
whilst the 'Section 88' agreement and payments, and
agreements with other service providers, comprised the
'service purchasing' component. The government under-
wrote ('insured') the costs of any variations in the health
states (and hence demands for health care) of the targeted
individuals. The sicker they were, and the more treatments
they sought, the higher the government's costs. Payments
came from a single pool provided by all New Zealand tax-
payers, and were made to providers when targeted indi-
viduals consumed care. The 'welfare benefit' payment was
an output of the insurance 'hub' as it was a payment for
services purchased in the service purchasing market.
As the majority of citizens were not eligible for targeted
welfare benefits for primary health care, they had no need
for the services of the taxpayer-funded 'primary health
care insurance hub'. They were fully responsible for all of
their costs of treatment. Costs from any variations in these
individuals' health states were borne out-of-pocket, either
directly in payments for services, or via private health
insurance. These individuals were said to be 'self-insur-
ing'. These patients paid the full costs of their treatment
direct to service providers.
Under the fee-for-service payment arrangements pre-
NZPHCS, service providers bore none of the insurance-
related financial risks associated with variations in the
health states of any of their patients, either self-insuring or
targeted welfare beneficiaries. Each instance of treatment
was fully paid for, either wholly by the patient, or by a
combination of patient payment and taxpayer subsidy.
Whilst some practitioners voluntarily waived charges for
some payments, this is a normal commercial decision
made by any business operator who chooses to offer
selected discounts to specific clients, and does not impose
any insurance-based risk management obligation in
respect of that client, as is the case in the two-sided insur-
ance market. Providers' engagement in the two-sided mar-
ket was thus solely as suppliers of services.
As in the case of any subsidy where the patient does not
pay the full cost of treatment out-of-pocket, subsidised
patients will likely consume more care than is necessary
(e.g. over-consumption by the 'worried well' and supplier-
induced demand, where providers, knowing that the
patient is not paying the full costs, recommends more
expensive treatments than necessary or treats beyond the
point where a 'cure' has been effected – known as moral
hazard behaviour [29]). As only a small proportion of
individuals received subsidies pre-NZPHCS (and most
paid some form of co-payment out-of-pocket), moral haz-
ard costs were likely to be relatively small. Any moral haz-
ard costs that were incurred by subsidised patients were
borne collectively by the entire pool of New Zealand tax-
payers. Furthermore, as there was only one state-funded
insurance 'hub' pooling risks for targeted individuals, and
participation by eligible individuals in the pool could not
be denied, the incentives that typically face competing
insurers to manipulate the risk profile of the patient pool
by 'cream-skimming' were absent.
Two-Sided Markets Under the NZPHCS
At the simplest level, the NZPHCS fundamentally changes
both the size and the locus of residual risk bearing in
respect of health state variations in the recipients of subsi-
dised health care. Multiple PHOs, with the potential to
compete against each other, rather than the single Minis-
try of Health, become the 'hubs' in the two-sided primary
health care market, and all citizens who register with
PHOs become parties to the insurance-based health-state
risk pooling and service purchasing that the PHOs, rather
than the Ministry of Health, are charged with undertaking.
Government subsidies change from being an output of an
insurance hub (i.e. service purchasing payments) to an
input into one (i.e. insurance premiums). The structures
and financing arrangements espoused in the NZPHCS
model appear consistent with the trends emerging in
many countries, where with the use of premium subsidies
"government plays a major role in assuring that insuranceAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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coverage is universal and affordable, but with competition
in the provision of insurance and of medical care, in order
to stimulate efficiency and provider responsiveness to
consumer preferences" [30]. Whilst questions have been
raised about the extent of meaningful competition present
in New Zealand between PHO-insurers, the fundamental
shift in direction under the NZPHCS to a multi-insurer
model nonetheless invokes all of the cost consequences
that are associated with risk management under any insur-
ance-based scheme.
Insurance Consequences: Universal Insurance and PHO-Insurers
Firstly, as all citizens who register with a PHO become eli-
gible for subsidies, no registered citizen will face the full
cost of health care treatments provided. Whilst increased
subsidies and extensions from targeted to universal eligi-
bility are intended to induce those who could not afford
to pay for care previously to now seek it, these instruments
will also lead to a rise in the levels of inefficient over-con-
sumption relative to the pre-NZPHCS counterfactual as
the entire population now faces the incentive to ineffi-
ciently over-consume. Such behaviour has been docu-
mented previously in New Zealand in 1996 in respect of
targeted subsidies for under-six-year-olds becoming uni-
versal [31]. Furthermore, the new subsidies will 'crowd
out' at least part of the private contributions that the
newly-subsidised individuals would have previously paid.
Total costs of the system will rise, in many cases for no
additional health gain.
Secondly, although the quantum of government funding
for primary health care has been increased, the change in
the nature of funding away from fee-for-service to capita-
tion shifts the costs of demand variation in subsidised
patients' health states away from government into the pri-
vate sector. The PHOs have become the insurance hubs.
Capitation payments become insurance premium subsi-
dies, and PHOs now bear the risks of patient demand var-
iation. Once the capitation levels are set, the government
faces a predetermined charge every quarter, independent
of variations in the demand for health services based
upon actual patient health states. The only variations gov-
ernment faces attend to the number of individuals for
whom subsidies are paid and any movement of individu-
als between subsidy classes. In the first instance, responsi-
bility for cost variations due to variations in the health
states of both those individuals that the government used
to insure, and a very much larger number of additional
individuals who previously self-insured but are now party
to risk-sharing agreements, has been placed upon the
PHOs. However, where and how the costs of these varia-
tions are ultimately borne (and any surpluses that might
accrue), and their sizes, will depend upon the decisions
made by PHOs. Specifically, the ultimate size and alloca-
tion of costs and risks associated with patient demand var-
iations will be determined by the contracts PHOs have
with their service providers and their registered
populations.
Relationships and Residual Risk-Bearing
The change in the funding instrument of the 'social con-
tract' changes the relationships between all participants in
the sector. PHOs become both health insurers and health
service purchasers for their registered populations. Gov-
ernment is now simply a supplier of funding to the insur-
ers and managers of service delivery contracts, rather than
being the insurer and manager of those contracts itself.
The subsidy is a partial contribution towards the insur-
ance premiums of registered individuals. Government's
sole role is to specify the size of the subsidies, and any
contractual obligations associated with their application
(e.g. minimum service ranges and qualities, reporting
requirements). Patient out-of-pocket payments are now
not a part- or full-payment of the costs of a service ren-
dered by a service provider (a 'co-payment' in the classic
fee-for-service subsidy environment), but a premium 'top-
up' that brings the government premium subsidy up to
the level of the actuarially-determined premiums that will
be required to resource the PHO's contractual purchases
of treatments. Even though for administrative conven-
ience service providers collect patient payments, patient
payment size will be determined ultimately by the costs of
managing the insurance pool for, and of delivering treat-
ments to, the PHO's entire registered patient pool. Patient
payments must necessarily include factors that reflect the
costs and risks of health state variations in the treatment-
seeking behaviour of the PHO's entire registered patient
base, and the risk management practices of the PHO and
its subcontracted providers. These costs are incurred in
addition to any shortfall between any government sub-
sidy paid and the suppliers' actual costs of providing any
specific contracted treatments.
The change in insurance responsibility means that any
increase in moral hazard behaviour of patients alone
makes it extremely unlikely that any increase in average
subsidy under the NZPHCS will lead directly to a dollar-
for-dollar decrease in the average patient 'co-payment'
charged by providers, as it did under changes to the fee-
for-service 'Section 88' subsidies. This occurs simply
because the increases in cost from moral hazard actions
previously borne collectively by the government and the
taxpayer under Vote:Health are now reflected directly in
the prices paid by patients, as it is the PHOs and their sub-
contractors who must now underwrite these risks. As long
as the solitary instrument allowed under the NZPHCS for
collecting any revenue shortfalls from demand variation is
the patient payment to service providers, these payments
must necessarily include a component to meet such costs.
Thus it is not surprising that the Minister of Health hasAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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found that average patient co-payments in the "6–17 age
group could not be seen to adequately reflect the increase
in funding for that group in October 2003" [32] – indeed
any other result would suggest an atypical consumer
response to an increase in subsidy.
PHOs as Managed Care Organisations
As the NZPHCS institutions and relationships require
PHOs to act as both insurers and service purchasers, it
may be inferred that PHOs are acting as 'managed care
organisations', balancing the costs of and demands for,
primary health care within defined budgets (set by capita-
tion subsidies or premiums) by matching the allocation
of services purchased to the needs of the enrolled popula-
tion. Managed care models have evolved around a set of
fiscal and practice-based strategies, largely in response to
the over-consumption of care, overly-high costs and weak
incentives for providers to constrain costs that attend fee-
for-service-subsidised health care systems [33,34]. Prac-
tice-based managed care strategies seek to "reduce varia-
bility in medical care by identifying 'best practices' and
promoting adherence to guideline-based decision mak-
ing. This includes evaluating the appropriateness of serv-
ices rendered and the level of care necessary to provide the
services" [35]. Practice-based managed care strategies
appear appropriate for addressing the specific NZPHCS
objectives of co-ordinating care across a range of provid-
ers, responding to community needs and continuously
improving quality by better co-ordination, service innova-
tion and use of information. Fiscal strategies in managed
care typically involve some degree of financial risk-sharing
between service purchasers and service providers, based
upon the premise that it is more efficient for at least some
of the risk associated with patient demand variations typ-
ically underwritten by insurers to be "borne by the indi-
vidual physician for whom it is not a risk, but a
controllable cost" [36]. Capitation payment for service
delivery is one such fiscal strategy, along with preferred
provider networks, price-and-volume contracts and other
financial restrictions upon the freedom of practitioners to
supply and commission treatments [37].
Managed Care Fiscal Strategies to Alter Provider Behaviour
Capitation payments for remuneration of service delivery
are not axiomatic under the NZPHCS simply as a conse-
quence of the insurance premium subsidy inputs paid to
PHO-insurers being capitation payments. Any use of cap-
itation payments by PHOs in respect of their service deliv-
ery contracts occur on the 'output' side of the 'insurance
hub', and should be assessed in respect of their efficacy in
assisting the managed care entity in achieving its balanc-
ing of demands and costs of care within its budgets. Each
period, the insurer must pool the funds received in respect
of all registered/insured individuals – the premiums – and
from that income pay the costs of treatment for which the
insurer is liable for that subset of the registered/insured
population that requires services. The insurer thus bal-
ances the costs incurred by individuals against the reve-
nues received in respect of the total registered base, and
assumes responsibility for funding any shortfall (or keeps
as a profit any surplus) that arises if the costs incurred are
higher than the averages upon which the revenue is based
because the registered base is less healthy than the average
and consumes more services than average (that arises if
the costs incurred are lower than revenue averages due to
a more healthy than average registered base that con-
sumes fewer services than the average). The insurer thus
bears the financial variations associated with any varia-
tions in the patient health state from the averages upon
which revenue is determined. Managed care entities are
thus incentivised to look for ways to reduce costs in order
to increase profits (or increase the quantum or quality of
care provided within its fixed income budget). Even non-
profit managed care entities are incentivised to pursue
higher profits, as the higher the profits (lower the costs)
the more benefits the organisation is able to deliver to its
beneficiaries, and the 'better' the nonprofit entity is
deemed to perform [38].
Managed care entities can reduce the total cost of health
care by using terms in the service contract to incentivise
service providers to restrict their inefficient cost-causing
behaviour. The contractual terms 'share' the managed care
organisation's risks (and the associated costs) of varia-
tions in patient health states, and therefore demands for
service, with the service providers. If providers can reduce
costs (e.g. with preventative interventions and education),
then financial risk-sharing will incentivise providers to
alter their treatments in cost-conscious ways as they have
to bear some of the costs associated with variations in
patient health state, in the same manner as the insurance
company. Financial risk-sharing contracts incentivise pro-
viders to reduce their costs by separating at least some of
the determinants of providers' income streams (e.g. using
capitation payments and discounted-price-and-volume
payments) from the determinant of their costs (typically
instances of care delivered to patients). With some of their
revenues now 'fixed', providers can maintain their previ-
ous levels of profitability only by paying more attention to
constraining their costs [39]. However, whilst provider
costs can be constrained by reducing the extent of ineffi-
cient supplier-induced demand and other wasteful
expenditure, and reducing the quality of service provided
to an 'efficient' level, providers may also respond by
reducing the quality provided below the 'efficient' level
(e.g. overly-short consultations, queueing, rationing),
further sharing the risks and costs with other parties if fea-
sible (e.g. passing costs onto other contracting parties,
shifting demand to other service providers), or actively
engaging in 'selecting' a patient base that is lower-cost onAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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average than the level at which the provider is remuner-
ated, and thereby reducing the expected costs of the firm.
Managed Care Contracts and Incentive Intensity
The challenge for managed care organisations is to deter-
mine how much of the demand variation it is reasonable
to share, given that not all cost-causing events are control-
lable by practitioners (e.g. a practitioner cannot influence
the genetic predetermination or environmental circum-
stances that increase the health risk and hence demand of
some individuals). If too much risk is shared, providers
will pursue undesirable cost reduction activities at the
expense of other objectives [40]; if too little is shared, then
the costs of health care to the managed care insurer (and
by extension the providers of its revenues) will be higher
than necessary. Capitation funding provides the strongest
cost-constraint incentives of all the fiscal strategies upon
providers, with the strength of the incentive increasing
with the proportion of revenue received from capitation
[41]. Significant changes in practitioner behaviour have
been observed in the United States under contracts with
very low-powered financial incentives [42], suggesting
that schemes with very high levels of capitation may over-
incentivise provider cost-containment activities at the
expense of other objectives, by placing more financial risk
than is optimal upon providers [43].
Typically, managed care schemes also involve some com-
promises for patients. In order to constrain the prices paid
by purchasers (via taxation, insurance premiums and out-
of-pocket patient payments) in highly-subsidised systems
and to ensure value-for-money spent, there must necessar-
ily be some reductions in patient choice of practitioners,
available treatments or treatment quality, and potentially
even service rationing and queueing, relative to the coun-
terfactual of an unrestrained fee-for-service payment
regime [44]. Indeed, these are the very types of compro-
mise that attend the provision of fully-capitated (via pop-
ulation-based budgets) state-funded public hospital
services offered in New Zealand by the District Health
Boards, which are in effect the 'care managers' in respect
of these services for their designated geographic
(equivalent to registered) populations, and the fully state-
funded Primary Care Trusts in England's NHS [45]. Man-
aged care schemes are therefore typically also associated
with increased levels of overt monitoring relative to fee-
for-service indemnity-type schemes in order to ensure that
the service quality, range and availability do not fall below
predetermined minimum acceptable levels [46]. Such
monitoring adds substantial cost overheads to the man-
aged care model, but as long as the cost reductions
achieved exceed the additional costs within acceptable
service qualities, managed care models can be more effi-
cient than traditional indemnity-based fee-for-service
insurance models [47].
Provider Charging and Managed Care Fiscal Strategies
In order to effectively design and manage contracts with
service providers, so that the service providers are given
sufficient incentives to constrain costs but still pursue
other objectives, and are unable to shift onto other enti-
ties the risk that the managed care organisation deems
providers should optimally bear, the managed care organ-
isation typically uses contract terms to control all aspects
of service provider remuneration in respect of treatments
provided to registered patients. All service provider reve-
nues relating to the contracts are typically provided from
managed care funds (from premium/subsidy income or
co-payments from insured individuals). Where co-pay-
ments are made direct to the service provider, these are
generally in the form of a fixed deductible (excess) at a
level determined by the managed care organisation rather
than a fee set by the service provider to recover costs.
Indeed, any financial incentive effect upon a service pro-
vider in a contract with a managed care organisation will
be 'undone' if the provider has the arbitrary ability to set
patient co-payments to recoup any costs not provided by
the managed care contract remuneration. A provider that
has power to set co-payments has the power to shift onto
patients that proportion of the risk that the managed care
entity has deemed the provider should optimally bear.
Furthermore, any financial incentives imposed by the
managed care entity to alter provider behaviour (e.g. to
induce increases in preventative interventions) are also
reduced. Neither the cost savings nor service improve-
ments sought from the financial risk-sharing contract are
likely to be delivered to the extent anticipated by the man-
aged care organisation when designing the contract. If any
behaviour changes are educed in such a contractual
arrangement, they will result from the practice-based strat-
egies of the managed care organisation rather than the fis-
cal strategies.
If a provider with a financial incentive contract has the
ability to set patient co-payments independently of the
contract, then the provider can replicate the cash flows
and absence of patient demand variation risk-bearing that
attend a fee-for-service payment scheme. The provider fee-
setting ability thus renders futile any attempt by the man-
aged care organisation to influence provider cost-causing
behaviour using fiscal strategies. The patient ends up
paying the costs of the provider's share of the risks
directly, in addition to the costs of the premium paid to
the managed care entity. Any low-cost benefits that man-
aged care models promise relative to fee-for-service
insurance schemes are therefore also negated. The patient/
consumer pays the extra costs in addition to facing the
restrictions in choice, provider availability and service
quality that attend the managed care model. Where the
patient can balance the costs of premium, co-paymentAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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and service restrictions against the costs and benefits of
alternative heath insurance models, if the managed care
package is unfavourably costly, the patient will purchase
an alternative. Overly costly managed care models where
providers can arbitrarily levy patient charges will be una-
ble to survive in the face of competition from other, less
costly models such as provider-constrained managed care
organisations and fee-for-service indemnity insurance
arrangements.
If, however, the patient does not pay both the premium
and the co-payment (e.g. the premium is paid from taxa-
tion revenue rather than directly from patient funds, so
that the patient cannot 'internalise' the trade-off between
the size of the premium and the size of the co-payment),
any patient-based comparison with an alternative service
is based solely upon the size of the co-payment that the
patient faces. The higher the level of the premium subsidy,
and the smaller the amount of the premium subsidy that
can be transferred to an alternative insurer-provider
model, the less favourable any competing alternative will
appear to the patient [48], and the less likely it is that sub-
stitution to other models will occur. If the market for
health care provision lacks the competitive discipline pro-
vided by alternative models, the overly-costly insurer-pro-
vider combination will persist, even though the
alternative combinations would be less costly in total,
resulting in persistently higher costs of primary health
care than would be achievable in an environment where
alternative models can freely compete.
PHO Fiscal Strategies and the 1938 Practitioner Charging 
'Compromise'
The principal challenge facing New Zealand's managed
care PHOs is that the very nature of the institutions and
structures that have emerged under the NZPHCS pose
some significant barriers to PHOs that restrict their ability
to act as true managed care organisations. The stated
intentions of the NZPHCS show contractual relationships
between patients and PHOs (Figure 3), indicating that
PHOs could charge registered individuals directly to
recoup the difference between capitation subsidies and
actuarially-calculated insurance premiums to fully-fund a
managed care entity and utilise fiscal strategies to incen-
tivise service providers to manage costs. In principle, such
a funding arrangement would allow PHOs to develop a
range of contractual relationships with a variety of provid-
ers that reflect both the extent of risk borne by each PHO
given the health state of its patient base and the amount
of risk desirable to be shared with specific providers in
order to educe the desired behaviour changes, as in true
managed care fiscal strategies, whilst simultaneously
allowing patients to make the cost tradeoffs and select
their desired PHO insurer on the basis of a bundle of cost
and service characteristics. However, if the fundamental
tenet of the 1938 compromise that allowed medical prac-
titioners receiving income from government sources to
levy additional charges on patients directly and independ-
ently of the PHO has been carried over into the NZPHCS,
it renders impotent any attempt by PHOs to use fiscal
strategies to constrain costs or incentivise desired provider
behaviour.
Unconstrained Practitioner Charging Rights
Mandatory reporting by PHOs to their DHBs under the
NZPHCS is based upon "the fees that their practices will
be charging for standard consultations to the individuals
in different groups" [49]. This suggests that practitioner
charging of patients at the point of service consumption is
the predominant, if not the only, way envisaged for PHOs
and their subcontractors to recoup any additional costs of
primary health care not covered by government subsidies.
Even though alternative PHO charging models are theo-
retically feasible, 'grandfathering' of the historic right of
medical practitioners to levy charges upon patients at serv-
ice consumption has become the default method of pre-
mium top-up collection. Unless PHOs can contractually
constrain the right of practitioners to charge patients, they
will be able to operate as managed care entities only in
respect of practice-based strategies.
There is little evidence of any constraints on general prac-
titioners' rights to independently charge occurring in prac-
tice under the NZPHCS, at least in respect of the contracts
between PHOs and the independent, for-profit private
sector general practitioners that comprise the vast major-
ity of the general practitioner workforce. The pro-forma
'back-to-back' contract offered on the Ministry of Health
website as a model contract between general practitioners
and PHOs (and is therefore likely to be similar to that
between all private general practitioners and their PHOs)
presumes that the PHO will simply 'pass on' capitation
payments related to service provision directly to the serv-
ice providers in respect of those patients that the service
provider 'registers' with the PHO, suggesting that no such
contractual constraint is being effected by the majority of
PHOs. Whilst charged with managing risks as an insur-
ance company on the one hand as a consequence of the
shifting of responsibility for demand variation from the
previous insurers (government and self-insuring individu-
als), PHOs are unable, due to the 'grandfathered'
expectation of practitioners that they can still arbitrarily
charge patients, from engaging effectively in using fiscal
strategies to manage the financial risks that normally
attend insurance-based managed care organisations.
Governance Arrangements and Contractual Content
Furthermore, as long as service providers dominate the
governance of PHOs, it is extremely unlikely that PHOs
will enter into contracts with their contractor-governorsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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that share risks optimally by constraining the individual
practice behaviour and profit-making potential of those
selfsame contractor-governors. If the PHO cannot actively
manage its financial risks using contracts, its optimal strat-
egy is not to bear any financial risks at all. Thus, the
default PHO contracting stance is likely to be one that
simply shifts the capitation payments to service providers,
who can then recoup any additional costs directly from
patients.
As patients face barriers to exiting the subsidised system
(they cannot take their state subsidies with them to a pri-
vate insurer or any other practitioner operating outside
the NZPHCS arrangements), and competition between
PHOs is effectively non-existent, there are few competitive
pressures acting to discourage PHOs from 'passing on'
financial risks, or to constrain any additional costs that
will arise from these actions. It is therefore extremely
unlikely in the New Zealand context that capitation pay-
ment of service providers will be used in an actuarially-
reasoned way to share a defined proportion of managea-
ble risks between PHOs and service providers in order to
exert controls upon service provider behaviour. Rather,
the risk exists that as premium subsidies from government
increase, and these are passed indiscriminately onto serv-
ice providers, service providers may face overly-strong
financial incentives. Whereas under constrained systems,
these overly strong incentives may invoke quality reduc-
tion and under-servicing, in the NZPHCS where no such
constraints apply, service providers will likely respond
simply by passing on their increased share of financial
risks via increased costs to patients. Such actions effec-
tively 'undo' the benefits of patient risk pooling that in the
first place provide the rationale for patients to join an
insurance-based managed care scheme. All of the addi-
tional costs of an insurance scheme are incurred, but few
of the cost-constraining tools of managed care are availa-
ble. Indeed, such a scheme is likely more costly than a uni-
versal indemnity-based insurance scheme. Practitioners
can recreate fee-for-service remuneration, so are left no
worse off, but patients are worse off as they must endure
restrictions in practitioner choice, service quality and serv-
ice quantity, as well as paying the higher costs of treat-
ment and institutional administration and monitoring
than they would under the counterfactual.
Given the contractual limitations posed by the ability for
general practitioners to charge patients directly, and
strong general practitioner representation in the govern-
ance of PHOs, it is not surprising to find that most of New
Zealand's seventy-seven PHOs as at December 2004 are
undertaking no active insurance-based fiscal risk manage-
ment activities. Financial risk management is not men-
tioned at all in the Ministry of Health-commissioned
2004 review [50] of PHO management services. An exam-
ination of the financial accounts of five PHOs affiliated to
a general practitioner-owned management company in
Wellington confirms that all capitation monies are being
paid directly to either the practitioners (the component
identified in Table 1 as GMS/Nurse Subsidies) or the man-
agement company (the payments identified in Table 1 as
Services to Improve Access (SIA) Subsidies and per-capita
management fees), with the PHOs undertaking no finan-
cial risk management activities [51]. Management fees
and SIA payments are being used to fund the practice-
based managed care strategies that PHOs are undertaking.
PHOs are thus 'passing on' all the financial risks conse-
quences of variations in patient demands under the
NZPHCS arrangements are vested in the PHO-insurers to
individual service providers by 'passing on' the capitation
funding in its entirety.
Service Providers Become Insurance Companies
PHO 'passing on' contracts are in effect turning the service
deliverers into the 'insurance hubs' of the NZPHCS. Even
though it is the service providers who now receive the gov-
ernment-funded GMS/Nurse subsidies, the payments are
still insurance premiums and must be managed as such.
The subsidies cannot be considered in any way equivalent
to the 'Section 88' payments. In any given period, service
providers must now manage the demands of all insured
individuals – that is, their entire registered patient base –
and the costs that a subset of them will incur. This means
that service providers should be undertaking the task of
determining the actuarially-fair premiums to charge each
registered individual and recouping the costs from them
all. However, service providers are not trained or qualified
in the operation of insurance companies, and they do not
typically have mechanisms in place for collecting remu-
neration unrelated to service consumption. A service pro-
viders' interaction with registered individuals is typically
confined to the episodic interaction that occurs when an
individual consumes care. Given the pre-NZPHCS prac-
tice of charging co-payments only to those individuals
who consume care, it is not surprising to find that, once
again, for administrative convenience, the pre-NZPHCS
business model of patient charging only upon consump-
tion of services is being used to recoup premium top-ups
in the NZPHCS.
Risk-Rated Insurance Premiums
Utilising pre-NZPHCS arrangements to collect premium
top-ups invokes some significant distributional conse-
quences. Whereas pre-NZPHCS, the demand variations
and associated risk management costs for the small subset
of the population who received subsidies were shared
jointly by all taxpayers, and self-insuring individuals faced
the costs of variation only in respect of their own individ-
ual demand, under the NZPHCS, as payments are col-
lected in the form of patient charges at each consultation,Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
Page 16 of 22
(page number not for citation purposes)
the variations associated with the demands of all 3.7 mil-
lion registered New Zealanders and the risk management
costs associated with the very much larger insurance
scheme are borne only by that subset of the registered
population that consumes health care.
Furthermore, as the levy is collected upon each treatment
consumed, the more treatments an individual consumes,
the more of the additional costs intended to be borne by
the provider and the PHO (and by extension the wider
insured population), are paid by the individual patient
seeking treatment. Rather than sharing risk management
costs amongst the entire population as intended by an
insurance scheme, the charging instruments of the
NZPHCS, and specifically the 'grandfathered' 1938 charg-
ing agreement, ensure that these costs are paid only by the
sick. Indeed, the result is that the frequently sick pay a per-
fectly risk-rated individual insurance premium contribu-
tion that is determined by their actual health state, as it is
perfectly correlated with their instances of demand for
care. Risk-rated insurance premiums vary the premium
paid by an individual based upon the amount of risk an
individual brings to the scheme. Sicker individuals bring
more costs as they consume more care. In a community-
rated system, all individuals pay the same premium, irre-
spective of their individual likelihood of consuming
(based upon the 'community' or 'population-based' aver-
age likelihood of consuming). When an individual who is
riskier pays a higher premium than a less risky individual,
this is termed risk-rating, as the individual likely to cause
more cost pays more of the costs of the pool. As a sicker
individual consumes more treatments, more co-payments
will be made. Premium top-ups are higher for sicker indi-
viduals, therefore the premium top-up under the
NZPHCS is risk-rated.
Meanwhile, the infrequently sick enjoy lower charges for
health care due to increased subsidies under the NZPHCS,
so are more likely consume more care than previously, in
the form of 'over-consumption by the worried well'. These
increased costs are added to the charges levied by
providers on consuming individuals, leading to even
higher charges to the sick, which are borne disproportion-
ately by the more frequently sick, who are less likely to
inefficiently over-consume in response to increased subsi-
dies as they are more likely to be genuinely ill.
Risk Redistribution and Equity
Whilst it is recognised that under the pre-NZPHCS, some
individuals paid the full cost of their primary health care,
and with constrained resources there will be a require-
ment for some patients to continue to make some contri-
bution towards their health care costs, the equity of
recouping the highest charges from the lowest-subsidised,
sicker-than-average individuals, with the burden on these
individuals rising substantially as more individuals of
other subsidy classes receive higher subsidies over time,
irrespective of any change to those individuals' health
states, warrants consideration.
Pre-NZPHCS, the self-insuring majority faced no costs
related to the consumption behaviour of services by other
individuals except via taxation. Under the NZPHCS, they
bear the financial consequences of changes to both the
consumption behaviour of all other patients registered at
their practitioner, and the financial consequences of the
lack of behaviour-altering incentives resulting from capi-
tation 'passing on' and patient charging, directly in their
payments when consuming. Due to their financial status
(i.e. aged 24–64 years and not living in areas identified as
9 and 10 in the New Zealand Deprivation Index), previ-
ously self-insuring individuals are also most likely to be
paying the higher taxation required to fund higher pre-
mium subsidies. The burden of the additional risk man-
agement costs will be highest on the last group of
previously self-insuring individuals to receive higher sub-
sidies, and will be especially acute if the subsidy increases
are accompanied by ill-informed regulatory restraint on
the payments made by the newly-subsidised in order to
keep constant the sum of their subsidy and their co-pay-
ment, without consideration of the additional costs asso-
ciated with the subsidy increase. Under these
circumstances, over time, previously self-insuring individ-
uals can expect to pay substantially more to a subsidised
provider than to a provider who eschews the subsidised
system entirely.
To date there is very little evidence of providers eschewing
the subsidised scheme. Therefore, there will be very little
information available to either regulators or patients to
determine what constitutes a 'fair' charge for services inde-
pendent of the charges associated with financial risk-bear-
ing. If provider collectives can utilise their professional
membership status to limit the extent of competition
from unsubsidised practitioners, then competition from
unsubsidised practitioners is likely to be weak, and the
likelihood of ill-informed regulatory restraint substantial.
[Anti-competitive behaviour by medical practitioners has
previously been found in respect of the members of the
Ophthalmological Society of New Zealand found guilty
under Section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 for refusing
to register foreign ophthalmologists to practice in New
Zealand in order to carry out cataract surgery at lower
remuneration from government contracts than the current
incumbents collectively agreed to provide the surgery
[52]. Moreover, in the absence of an unsubsidised sector
with the ability to signal the costs of service provision
independent from risk management, the government will
have little information upon which to base the setting of
its own subsidy contributions. This situation is very differ-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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ent from England, where the vibrant private sector stands
as a benchmark against which government can assess both
the size of subsidies offered to, and the quality and quan-
tity of services provided by, NHS entities.
High Prices in Evidence
Evidence of higher patient co-payments under the
NZPHCS, relative to its predecessor regime, is provided by
the Consumers' Institute. Higher patient charges are
reported in Interim PHOs than in Access PHOs, even for
those individuals who generate identical subsidies under
the two funding regimes [53]. This finding is consistent
with the greater burden of additional risk management
costs falling on practices with a larger number of lower-
subsidised registered individuals. Rather than impose all
the additional costs on the lower-subsidised individuals,
these practices are opting to spread the higher costs
amongst all patients. The Independent Practitioners Asso-
ciation chief executive has acknowledged that higher
charges to patients are due to the increased financial risk
that he claims practitioners are bearing. However, that
patient charges have increased indicates that the practi-
tioners are not absorbing the higher financial risks within
their businesses, but are passing them onto patients.
That the burden of additional costs under the NZPHCS is
real, significant and greatest upon frequently-ill low-sub-
sidised individuals is in part reflected by the introduction,
on 1 July 2004, of Care Plus. This additional capitated
subsidy is designated to meet the additional costs incurred
(initially to their practitioners, but ultimately passed on in
higher patient charges) by frequently ill individuals who
are not sufficiently sick to qualify for the higher subsidies
available to high-use patients consuming twelve or more
treatments in a twelve month period: "It's aimed at people
who need to visit their family GP or nurse often because
of significant chronic illnesses such as diabetes or heart
disease, have acute medical or mental health needs, or a
terminal illness" [54]. If the original capitation subsidies
and population-based funding formulae had fairly allo-
cated the costs of the system amongst individuals based
upon patient need, and PHOs and practitioners had
entered into contracts that minimised financial risk bear-
ing costs and allocated the additional costs equitably
across all patient classes, then arguably a Care Plus-type
adjustment less than two years into the operation of the
NZPHCS should not have been necessary. That the first
substantive adjustment to the NZPHCS contracts
addresses the costs of the category of patients that the fore-
going analysis predicts will be most disadvantaged pro-
vides some strong circumstantial evidence supporting the
analysis of this paper.
Patient Pool Size Cost Implications
The full extent of the inequitable allocation of additional
costs under the NZPHCS model is not restricted solely to
the costs of increased consumption associated with
increased subsidies and the absence of effective cost-shar-
ing to induce providers to constrain their cost-causing
behaviour. The inability to effectively incentivise service
providers that results in PHOs 'passing on' capitation con-
tracts to service providers, results in the service providers
becoming the effective insurance providers. Their insur-
ance pools therefore have very small numbers, so will
almost certainly lead to greater variation of profitability
between providers than would occur with larger patient
pools. Furthermore, patients with identical health states
in different patient pools will incur substantially different
premium payments, simply because of the wide distribu-
tion of patient health states between insurers with very
small pools. Thus, the NZPHCS will be even more costly
and even less equitable than both a standard managed
care scheme and the pre-NZPHCS arrangements.
Large Numbers, Insurer Profitability and Pool Management
Insurance systems rely upon the 'law of large numbers' to
reduce the variations in insurer profitability resulting
from the unequal distribution throughout the population
of the characteristics that cause the insurer to incur costs.
In the case of primary health care, the cost-causing event
is a patient developing a condition that causes the patient
to seek primary health care treatment. Assuming the like-
lihood of an individual requiring treatment in any one
period is random, any given pool of patients will have a
pool 'average likelihood of requiring treatment' that is
either higher or lower than the population average. The
smaller the pool, the greater is the likelihood that the pool
average will be substantially different from the population
average. However, the larger the pool, the greater the like-
lihood that the pool average will be close to the popula-
tion average. When insurer revenue is determined by
population averages, but the costs are determined by pool
averages, in any given period half the pools will have costs
in excess of revenues (incur losses) and half will have costs
less than revenues (incur profits). The smaller the pool,
the greater the probability of making a profit or loss sub-
stantially different to that of a pool with the population
average.
Typically, if demands between periods are random and
unrelated, then over time each pool will incur a random
number of profits and losses that cancel each other out.
Where a pool makes a loss, it is covered either by profits
retained from the past, or some other financing (e.g.
owner underwriting or reinsurance). Managing cashflows
between periods thus incur costs – known as risk manage-
ment costs. Managers of insurance pools seek to maximise
profits, which leads to incentives to minimise risk man-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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agement costs. For random pools, merging pools to
obtain a profit closer to the population average will
reduce the costs associated with managing cash flows in
the event of a loss. The optimum pool size may therefore
be quite large. However, if the demands are correlated,
either that in one period one pool has a known greater
likelihood of incurring a profit or a loss, or that demands
of a pool across time are linked to demands in past peri-
ods, then the allocation of costs will be correlated and the
pool will be either habitually profitable or habitually loss-
making. If an insurer knows the pool is habitually profit-
able, then profits can be routinely extracted. Such an
insurer has no incentive to merge the pool with a pool of
unknown costs, as profitability may be reduced. However,
if the pool is habitually loss-making, then the insurer faces
an incentive to merge with other pools in order to reduce
the probability of making a loss. Merging pools in this
manner leads to larger numbers and a reduction in the
likelihood that any one pool is substantially different
from the population average. However, if there is any pos-
sibility that an insurer with a known low-cost pool can
resist merging with other pools, the 'average' profitability
of the remaining pools will be less than the population
average including the highly profitable pool [55].
The incidence of health costs is likely to be correlated,
both within and between time periods. Specific individu-
als with similarly low costs and similarly high costs may
patronise similar insurers (e.g. individuals within a com-
munity may all get sick simultaneously, or an entire fam-
ily with genetically linked high health needs may seek
cover from the same company), and there is substantial
evidence that a very large proportion of health costs are
incurred by a very small number of individuals, even in
respect of primary care health care demands [56,57]. This
suggests that the variation in health pools is significant.
United States data suggests that even where there is infor-
mation on an individual's past consumption of health
care, only "an estimated 20% to 25% of total variation in
health care expenditures on an individual basis is predict-
able, and the remainder is random" [58]. This suggests
that the optimal size of a health insurance pool will be
large in order to manage the risks of the insurer incurring
losses, and to reduce the costs of risk management. The
United States Health Care Financing Administration con-
siders capitated primary health care physicians or physi-
cian groups to be at substantial financial risk if they have
fewer than 25,000 patients, whilst "primary care physi-
cians may find capitation disadvantageous even if they
have only one or two patients who happen to require
intensive medical care during a given year, or have a con-
sistently sicker panel of patients relative to other primary
care physicians" [59].
Pool Size of New Zealand Insurers
In New Zealand, private sector general practitioners are
typically sole practitioners. Even though they may share
some common overheads via a 'group practice', including
clinic space and reception services, each practitioner usu-
ally maintains an individual, independent practice based
upon a 'patient list' that contains typically between 1200
patients in a rural practice and 2000 patients in an urban
practice. Whilst PHOs notionally provide insurance cover
for patient bases of between 3000 and 300,000 individu-
als [60], the 'passing on' of capitation payments results in
effective insurance pools being managed at the level of
each individual general practitioner – that is, insurance
pools of between 1200 and 2000 individuals. Given the
United States evidence, these numbers are likely to be far
too small to efficiently manage the demand variation that
will occur even with a random distribution of health states
amongst the population. Profits will be larger and losses
larger than if pools were larger. The costs of risk manage-
ment will therefore be greater than if the pools were larger.
Loss-making practitioner-insurers in New Zealand face
few incentives to merge their pools to reduce risk manage-
ment costs as would occur in a typical insurance market,
as their first resort is to recoup losses simply by charging
patients for the difference between costs and PHO
subsidies. The system offers no other incentives to manage
the pool efficiently, so the greater profit variations, and
their associated costs to patients, will persist largely
unchecked. As the pools are small and profitability varia-
tions great, there will therefore be substantial variations in
patient co-payment prices amongst providers, simply
because of the variations in the underlying patient health
states of the patient list. That is, if the insurer-provider has
a 'high cost' pool, patient co-payments will be higher,
even for a low-demand individual, than those of a pro-
vider with a population average pool, simply to recover
the additional costs of variation in the demand of the
pool from the capitated population average. The patient's
payments are therefore determined by the risk level of the
provider's pool – a patient of a given health state will pay
different prices at different practices simply because of the
'luck' that determines the practitioner's risk profile relative
to the population average. In the presence of very small
pools, variations between individual provider pools even
within a single subsidy level may be substantially greater
than the population-based variations upon which the
differential capitation premium subsidies (Interim and
Access) of the PHO are based, leaving individual provid-
ers subject to returning very large losses or very large prof-
its. Profitable insurer-providers will be able to extract
profits in excess of costs as dividends, and even charge co-
payments similar to those of competing high-cost provid-
ers, not because of any effort on the insurer-provider'sAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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part, but simply because of the 'luck' in allocation of
patients and health care demands.
Pool Management and Provider-Insurer Competition
Normally, a patient facing a high patient charge will seek
to shift custom to a lower-charging provider. However, a
profitable, 'low-cost' NZPHCS provider will face few
incentives to register a patient who responds to the prices
of the 'high-cost' pool by seeking to transfer to the 'low-
cost' pool, simply because that patient's past patronage of
a 'high-cost' pool suggests that the patient is more likely to
have higher-than-average demand characteristics. A 'low-
cost' provider would prefer to engage in screening behav-
iour to assess the health state of the patient to ascertain
that the patient's health state is at or better than the pro-
vider's current average before making an offer to the
patient to join ('cream-skimming'). High-cost pools, on
the other hand, face opposite incentives. Any transferring
patient may actually improve the pool average, so is less
likely to be 'screened out'. Hence, where such pool man-
agement occurs, the system equilibrium tends towards a
small number of very large high-cost pools and many
small low-cost pools, as occurs in the United States man-
aged care market with large state-funded Medicare and
Medicaid pools, and many smaller privately-funded man-
aged care entities. In the New Zealand environment, over
time this could manifest as a large number of small pri-
vate, for-profit pools, and a few very large pools more
likely to be operated by private, nonprofit providers who
are less motivated by the profitability of the pool than by
the nonprofit's objective to serve individuals. The larger
pools, however, will be the more costly ones. If premium
subsidies are adjusted over time based upon the costs of
the higher-cost pools, then the smaller lower-cost pools
will become even more profitable.
Furthermore, efficient operation of the insurance market
requires provider-insurers to know, in respect of the risk
profile of their pool, whether a surplus in any one year is
a profit, which can be extracted, or simply a surplus
required to be held to underwrite losses in future years.
Specialist actuarial knowledge is required to make such
judgements: "since providers are exposed to exogenous
risk, efficient risk pooling requires reinsurance for provid-
ers" [61]. Operating general practices under the pre-
NZPHCS assumptions that any surplus in a given year is a
profit that can be extracted under the NZPHCS conditions
where general practices are insurers will inevitably result
in the extraction of funds that should have been applied
to risk management, leading to the likelihood of even
greater losses in the future, simply because the surpluses
that would ordinarily have been retained to manage the
risks of future losses have been extracted as dividends by
for-profit providers. Thus, contrary to expectations, the
NZPHCS will not "guard against funds being diverted
from health gain and health services to shareholder divi-
dends" [62]. Rather, the structures and relationships that
have emerged have actually made it more likely that such
activities will occur, even if inadvertently, because general
practitioners who do not have the skills or experience to
act as insurers have, as a result of the changes in funding
and evolution of contracts under the NZPHCS become
charged with the insurance task.
Provider Information and Pool Management
Moreover, if there is any additional potential for providers
to utilise information about patients to 'select' their
patients to manage costs, the risk management overhead
of the NZPHCS will be even greater than under the coun-
terfactual of a standard, separate-insurer managed care
model. Arguably, given that only around 25% of cost var-
iation is predictable, such selection may be difficult to
achieve. However, of the small amount of variation that is
predictable, past consumption of health services provides
the best indicator [63]. This suggests that if active pool
selection can be undertaken by insurers, access to an indi-
vidual's past consumption information provides the best
potential for selection to occur. Provider-insurers are argu-
ably the best-placed to practice selection on this basis as
they have access, via medical records, to existing patients'
past medical history.
Reported actions of NZPHCS health service providers
declining to take people 'on the books' (i.e. as an insured
individual) but providing care as a 'casual' patient [64]
could be interpreted as either an act of screening in order
to avoid taking on the risks of a patient with unknown
health state until an assessment has been made, or an act
of deliberately declining a patient of probable high
demand based upon past registration. In either case,
patients are being denied coverage by the insurer of their
choice, even though that insurer, in the capacity as a serv-
ice provider, is happy to provide casual treatment. Given
that the risk to the provider from a casual treatment is less,
by the foregoing reasoning, casual treatments should cost
less to deliver than subsidised treatments, so the cost sav-
ings could be passed on to patients. However, few provid-
ers will be likely to offer such differentiated prices, as low-
subsidised patients willing to self-insure would likely face
lower costs under such a system, so would respond by
eschewing the subsidised system and opting for casual
treatment, thereby reducing both the possibility of the
low-cost practitioner extracting profits in excess of those
feasible at the population average, and the ability for pro-
viders to recoup risk-management costs disproportion-
ately from the highest co-paying class of patients.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis indicates that the arrangements
that have emerged under the NZPHCS, whilst in principleAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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a managed care insurance system, are substantially less
than optimal in respect of the requirements for a fully-
functioning, efficient managed care insurance model. It
appears that the use of institutions and relationships that
prevailed under the pre-NZPHCS system in an 'evolution-
ary' move towards what appears to be a fully-fledged man-
aged care model are likely to be counter-productive to the
equity objectives of the strategy, substantially more costly
than either the pre-NZPHCS system or the optimal man-
aged care model, and as a consequence of the limited
competition that exists, unlikely to respond to the normal
competitive pressures to evolve into a more cost-efficient
model. Thus, rather than the institutions and contracts
being a 'first step' in an evolving strategy, the current
higher-cost institutions and contracts are likely to become
entrenched, to the long-term detriment of both taxpayers
and patients.
Two instruments appear to be critical in the inability of
the NZPHCS to achieve its full range of managed care
objectives. The first is the presumption that general prac-
titioners would retain their individual right to set patient
co-payments independent of PHO contracts. This pre-
sumption has left PHOs with no meaningful ability to
practice financial risk management. Whilst there is no pol-
icy statement about the retention of the right to charge,
the unstated assumption that it exists has restricted the use
of fiscal strategies associated with traditional managed
care models. However, even if no such assumption
existed, the second instrument, the requirement that serv-
ice providers be part of PHO governance, means that pro-
viders have been granted sufficient power to ensure that
the contracts under the NZPHCS do not leave them any
worse off than pre-NZPHCS. In their capacity as PHO gov-
ernors, general practitioners would be unlikely to be party
to designing contracts that limit the professional
autonomy that has been their non-negotiable bottom line
in the development of New Zealand primary health care
policy since 1938. As successive governments have been
either unable or unwilling to restrain general practitioner
charging autonomy using legislative powers, it is unlikely
that PHOs, most of which are operating as general practi-
tioner supplier-owned co-operatives, would be able to
achieve such restraints using only mutually agreed con-
tractual mechanisms.
Given that the outcomes of the NZPHCS are largely pre-
dictable from an analysis of risk-bearing in health insur-
ance markets and the New Zealand history and
institutions, the advisability of instituting a full, insur-
ance-based managed care model with the associated
requirements on the insurance companies to manage
costs in a health care market that effectively denies to
these managed care insurance organisations half of the
tools normally available to such organisations to manage
their costs must be questioned. The higher costs and ineq-
uitable distribution can be observed even at this early
stage and will become more substantial over the next four
years as premium subsidies increase. Indeed, the full
extent of the higher costs at an individual level are likely
being masked in the early stages by the sheer size of the
additional government funding injected into the sector.
As unrestricted practitioner charging negates the effects of
patient demand pooling that normally accompany insur-
ance schemes, any attempt to set up a managed care sys-
tem based upon capitation payments of either the insurer
or the service providers appears to be fundamentally
flawed. This is not to say that practice-based strategies
associated with PHO management and services to
improve access cannot be legitimately and effectively
funded on a capitation basis and provide measurable ben-
efits. Indeed, benefits may have already accrued from
these strategies. Rather it is a commentary on the wisdom
of using capitation payments to fund the service delivery
components of a universal insurance scheme in the pres-
ence of practitioner price-setting autonomy. Under cur-
rent arrangements, the practice-based strategies would
have to be extremely effective to outweigh the substantial
additional costs of the imperfect insurance instruments
that attend the NZPHCS in order to deliver a system that
is of net greater benefit or offers better value-for-money
than its predecessor.
In principle, leaving aside the power and professional
autonomy of medical practitioners, the structures and
intended contracts in the NZPHCS offered a potentially
viable model of competing insurers and competing serv-
ice providers that had the potential to deliver an efficient
and effective insurance-based primary health care system
for New Zealand that was capable of real innovation in
both contracting and service delivery. However, to do so
would have required a truly competitive environment,
both in respect of insurance and service delivery markets,
with fully transferable insurance premiums independent
of insurer-service delivery contracts, and where insurers
were governed, managed and operated as specialist insur-
ance companies [65]. Such competition in the market for
purchasers of services, where patients could freely exercise
their insurance custom, would lead to genuine competi-
tion in the markets for both insurance customers and serv-
ice provision contracts, where it would be harder for
provider co-operatives to unilaterally determine the terms
and conditions under which they would enter into
contracts with insurers. This would have led to vibrant
competition not just for contracts, but also in the models
of insurance and care delivery that could move beyond
the managed care model under which the system was
established to alternative arrangements. If such a system
allowed patient co-payments determined by the insurer, it
would resemble the United States managed care model,Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:20 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/20
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but with the potential to evolve if models other than man-
aged care proved more efficient. Such innovation is occur-
ring in the United States as managed care proves less
desirable for some patients and their insurers [66]. If
patient co-payments were not allowed, then the New Zea-
land system it would resemble England's NHS. However,
this model would require full funding from government
sources.
In its present state however, the NZPHCS resembles nei-
ther of these models. It allows for all the additional costs
of an insurance-based system, but none of the equity ben-
efits of a fully state-funded system, and none of the fiscal
benefits of a managed care system that constrains some of
the excesses of insurance-based systems. Whilst there may
be gains from the practice-based managed care strategies
currently undertaken by PHOs, the costs of these gains
will not necessarily be able to compensate for the substan-
tial extra costs of the system as it is currently operating. If
the costs and inequities of the NZPHCS escalate as pre-
dicted, any gains may be quickly eroded. Unless the defi-
ciencies of the current insurance-based system are
addressed soon, the very substantial proportion of the
additional government funding committed to primary
health care will likely amount to an ill-judged, overly-
costly investment.
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